Lane Kenworthy "America's Social Democratic
Future". Foreign Affairs. 2 April
2014.
From: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140345/lane-kenworthy/americas-social-democratic-future
(Editor's note: This is a very long article with many detailed statistics. I have included only the major findings, conclusions and recommendations. For details supporting these, go to the link above.)
Obamacare has become the central battleground in an
ongoing war between liberals and conservatives over the size and scope of the
U.S. government, a fight whose origins stretch back to the Great Depression and
the New Deal.
Opponents of President Franklin Roosevelt’s
innovations were silenced when the New Deal’s reforms were locked in during the
Truman and Eisenhower years, and the U.S. welfare state took another leap
forward under Lyndon Johnson, whose Great Society agenda expanded public help
for the poor and created the government-administered health insurance programs
Medicare and Medicaid. But the following decades saw few major additions and
some notable setbacks, including the failure of President Bill Clinton’s
health-care reform effort in 1994.
Opponents of American-style social democracy are
fighting a losing battle. The ACA
represents another step on a long, slow, but steady journey away from the
classical liberal capitalist state and toward a peculiarly American version of
social democracy. Unlike in, say, northern Europe, where social democracy has
been enacted deliberately and comprehensively over the years by ideologically
self-aware political movements, in the United States, a more modest and patchy
social safety net has been pieced together by pragmatic politicians and
technocrats tackling individual problems.
Powerful forces will continue to fight those efforts,
and the resulting social insurance policies will emerge more gradually and be
less universal, less efficient, and less effective than they would otherwise
have been. But the opponents are fighting a losing battle and can only slow
down and distort the final outcome rather than stop it. Thanks to a combination
of popular demand, technocratic supply, and gradually increasing national
wealth, social democracy is the future
of the United States.
Social
democracy originated in the early twentieth century as a strategy to improve capitalism
rather than replace it. Today, people generally associate it
with European social democratic political parties and the policies they have
put in place, especially those in the Nordic countries, such as Denmark and Sweden. Over the course of the next half century,
the array of social programs offered by the federal government of the United
States will increasingly come to resemble the ones offered by those countries.
This prediction means something quite different today
than it would have a generation ago, when the label “social democratic”
referred quite narrowly to policies that made it easier for people to survive
with little or no reliance on earnings from employment. In the 1960s and 1970s, the practice of social democracy mostly meant
maintaining a large public safety net. Today, that’s too narrow a conception.
In recent decades, the Nordic countries
have supplemented their generous social programs with services aimed at
boosting employment and enhancing productivity: publicly funded child care
and preschool, job-training and job-placement programs, significant
infrastructure projects, and government support for private-sector research and
development. At the same time, the
Nordic governments have adopted a market-friendly approach to regulation.
Although they maintain regulations to protect workers, consumers, and the
environment, they balance those protections with a system that encourages
entrepreneurship and flexibility by making it easy to start or close a
business, to hire or fire employees, and to adjust work hours.
As
pioneered by the Nordic countries, modern social democracy means a commitment
to the extensive use of government policy to promote economic security, expand
opportunity, and ensure rising living standards for all. But
it aims to do so while also safeguarding
economic freedom, economic flexibility, and market dynamism, all of which
have long been hallmarks of the U.S. economy. The Nordic countries’ experience
demonstrates that a government can successfully combine economic flexibility
with economic security and foster social
justice without stymieing competition. Modern social democracy offers the
best of both worlds.
Still, the notion that the United States is likely to
further increase the size and scope of its welfare state might seem blind to
the reality of contemporary American politics. But step back and consider the
long run. The lesson of the past hundred years is that as the United States grows wealthier, Americans become more
willing to spend more to insure against risk and enhance fairness. Advances
in social policy come only intermittently, but they do come. And when they
come, they usually last.
That
trend is likely to continue. U.S. policymakers will recognize the benefits of
a larger government role in pursuing economic security, equal opportunity, and
rising living standards and will attempt to move the country in that
direction. Often, they will fail. But sometimes, they will succeed. Progress will be incremental, coming in
fits and starts, as it has in the past. New programs and expansions of
existing ones will tend to persist, because programs that work well become
popular and because the U.S. policymaking process makes it difficult for
opponents of social programs to remove them. Small steps and the occasional big
leap, coupled with limited backsliding, will have the cumulative effect of
significantly increasing the breadth and generosity of government social
programs.
Social
insurance allows a modern economy to hedge against risks without relying on
stifling regulations. To
understand why the United States is on the path to social democracy, one must
recognize that although it is a rich country -- and in the next half century,
it will grow even richer -- it nevertheless suffers from serious economic
failings. These are deep-seated problems;
although exacerbated by the Great Recession and the feeble recovery, they
predate the country’s recent economic troubles.
First, the United States does not ensure enough
economic security for its citizens. Second, the country is failing in its
promise of equal opportunity. Third, too few Americans have shared in the
prosperity their country has enjoyed in recent decades.
These failures owe in part to changes in the global economy,
especially the increasing competition faced by U.S. firms. American companies
selling goods or services in international markets confront foreign rivals that
are far more capable than in the past. Domestic industries face more
competition, too, as technological advances, falling construction and
transportation costs, and deregulation have reduced barriers to entry. In
addition, shareholders now want rapid appreciation in stock values. Whereas a
generation ago, investors in a company were happy with a consistent dividend
payment and some long-term increase in the firm’s stock price, they now demand
buoyant quarterly profits and constant growth.
These shifts benefit investors, consumers, and some
employees. But they encourage companies to resist pay increases, drop health
insurance plans, cut contributions to employee pensions, move abroad, downsize,
and replace regular employees with temporary ones -- or computers. Such
cost-cutting strategies end up weakening economic security, limiting
opportunities for low-skilled labor, and reducing income growth for many
ordinary Americans -- trends that are certain to continue into the foreseeable
future. In the coming decades, more Americans will lose a job, work for long
stretches without a pay increase, work part time or irregular hours, and go
without an employer-backed pension plan or health insurance.
Some believe that the best way to address the stresses and strains of the new economy is
to strengthen families, civic
organizations, or labor unions. Those are laudable aims. But these
institutions have been unraveling over the past half century, and although
advocates of revitalizing them offer lots of hope, they can point to little evidence of success.
An influential faction in Washington favors a different solution: shrink the federal
government. According to this view, reducing taxes and government spending
will improve efficiency, limit waste, and enhance incentives for investment,
entrepreneurship, and hard work, leading to faster economic growth. But this approach is predicated on the false
notion that the growth of government limits the growth of the private sector.
Over the course of the past century, the United States has gradually expanded
government spending, from 12 percent of GDP in 1920 to 37 percent in 2007.
Throughout that period, the country’s growth rate remained remarkably steady.
Other evidence comes from abroad: among
the world’s rich nations, those with higher taxes and government expenditures
have tended to grow just as rapidly as those with smaller governments. Moreover,
even if cutting taxes and reducing federal spending did produce faster growth,
the record of the past few decades suggests that too little of that growth
would benefit Americans in the middle and below.
Most of what social scientists call “social policy” is
actually public insurance. Social Security and Medicare insure individuals
against the risk of having little or no money after they retire. Unemployment
compensation insures individuals against the risk of losing their jobs.
Disability payment programs insure against the risk of individuals’ suffering
physical, mental, or psychological conditions that render them unable to earn a
living.
Other U.S. public services and benefits are also
insurance programs, even if people don’t usually think of them that way. Public
schools insure against the risk that private schools will be unavailable, too
expensive, or of low quality. Retraining and job-placement programs insure
against the risk that market conditions will make it difficult to find
employment. The Earned Income Tax Credit insures against the risk that one’s
job will pay less than what is necessary for a minimally decent standard of
living. Social assistance programs, such as food stamps and Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families, insure against the risk of being unable to get a job but
ineligible for unemployment or disability compensation.
Over the past century, the United States, like other
rich nations, has created a number of public insurance programs. But to achieve
genuine economic security, equal opportunity, and shared prosperity in the new
economy, over the course of the next
half century, the federal government will need to greatly expand the range and
scope of its existing social insurance programs and introduce new programs.
Of
course, spending on insurance comes at a price. Americans will need to pay more
in taxes. Moreover, the existence of insurance increases the
incentive for people to engage in risky behavior or to avoid employment.
However, insurance also has economic benefits. Better education and health care
improve productivity. Bankruptcy protection encourages entrepreneurship.
Unemployment compensation encourages a more mobile work force and makes it
easier for workers to improve their skills. Programs such as the Child Tax
Credit and the Earned Income Tax Credit enhance the educational and economic
prospects of children who grow up in poor households. And, crucially, social insurance allows a modern economy
to hedge against risks without relying on stifling regulations that specify
what businesses can and cannot do.
The experience of the world’s rich countries over the
past century should allay the fear that growth in the size and scope of public
social programs will weaken the U.S. economy. There surely is a level beyond
which public social spending hurts economic growth. But the evidence indicates
that the United States has not yet reached that level. In fact, the country is
probably still well below it.
Some observers, even many on the left, worry about the
applicability of Nordic-style policies -- which have succeeded in the context
of small, relatively homogeneous countries -- to a large, diverse nation such
as the United States. Yet moving toward social democracy in the United States
would mostly mean asking the federal government to do more of what it already
does. It would not require shifting to a qualitatively different social contract.
But can the
United States afford social democracy? As a technical matter, revising the U.S. tax code to raise the
additional funds would be relatively simple. The first and most important step
would be to introduce a national
consumption tax in the form of a value-added tax (VAT), which the
government would levy on goods and services at each stage of their production
and distribution. Analyses by Robert Barro, Alan Krueger, and other economists
suggest that a VAT at a rate of 12 percent, with limited exemptions, would
likely bring in about five percent of GDP in revenue -- half the amount
required to fund the expansions in social insurance proposed here.
A mix of other
changes to the tax system could generate an additional five percent of GDP
in tax revenues: a return to the federal income tax rates that applied prior to
the administration of President George W. Bush, an increase of the average effective federal tax rate for the top one
percent of taxpayers to about 37 percent, an end to the tax deduction for
interest paid on mortgage loans, new taxes on carbon dioxide emissions and
financial transactions, an increase in the cap on earnings that are subject to
the Social Security payroll tax, and a one percent increase in the payroll tax
rate.
These kinds of tax reforms and the social insurance
programs they would fund will not arrive all at once. It will be a slow
process, partly owing to a series of obstacles that social democratic ideas are
sure to face. But none of the barriers is likely to prove insurmountable.
Another potential
roadblock is the rightward shift in the balance of power among organized
interests outside the electoral arena, which exert substantial influence on
policymaking. Since the 1970s, businesses and affluent individuals have
mobilized, while the labor movement has steadily declined in membership. Yet
this shift has managed to only slow, not stop, the advance of progressive
social policy.
A final potential obstacle to American social
democracy is the structure of the U.S. political system, in which it is
relatively easy to block policy changes through congressional maneuvering or
effective vetoes. Given this structure, the kind of disciplined obstructionism
demonstrated by congressional Republicans during Obama’s tenure would surely threaten
the forward march of public insurance.
Sooner or later, however, Republican leaders will turn away from the staunch anti-government orientation that has shaped the party’s strategy and tactics in
recent years. In the long run, the center of gravity in the Republican Party
will shift, and the GOP will come to resemble center-right parties in western
Europe, most of which accept a generous welfare state and relatively high
taxes.
Three
things could potentially trigger such a shift. One is a loss by a very
conservative Republican candidate in an otherwise winnable presidential
election. If the party were to nominate a member of its
far-right or libertarian faction in 2016 or 2020, that candidate would almost
certainly lose, which would prompt a move back toward the center. Another factor favoring Republican
moderation is the growing importance to the party of working-class whites.
Perhaps most important, clear thinkers on the right
will eventually realize that given Americans’ desire for economic security and
fairness, the question is not whether the government should intervene but how
it should do so. An expansion of social
programs would not necessarily mean more government interference in markets and
weaker competition. Here again, the Nordic countries can show the way. The
conservative Heritage Foundation collaborates with The Wall Street Journal in a
project that grades countries on ten dimensions of economic freedom. Although
the United States has lower taxes and lower government spending than the Nordic
countries, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden score better, on average, on the other
eight measures, including the right to establish and run an enterprise without
interference from the state, the number of regulatory barriers to imports and
exports, and the number of restrictions on the movement of capital. Americans
want protection and support. To deliver those things, policymakers must choose between public insurance and regulation, and
conservatives ought to prefer the former.
Perhaps what is most important to note about the United States’ social democratic future
is that it will not look dramatically different from the present day. The
United States will not become a progressive utopia; rather, it will become a
better version of its current self. A
larger share of adults will be employed, although for many, the workweek will
be shorter and there will be more vacation days and holidays. Nearly all jobs
will be in the service sector, especially teaching, advising, instructing,
organizing, aiding, nursing, monitoring, and transporting; only around five
percent will be in manufacturing or agriculture. Most Americans will change
jobs and even careers more frequently than they do today. More Americans will
work in jobs with low pay, will lose a job more than once during their careers,
and will reach retirement age with little savings. Families, community
organizations, and labor unions might grow even weaker than they are now.
But by filling in the gaps in the public safety net,
the federal government will improve economic security, equal opportunity, and
shared prosperity for most Americans in spite of these changes. A social
democratic America will be a society with greater economic security and fairness.
Its economy will be flexible, dynamic, and innovative. Employment will be high.
Liberty will be abundant. Balancing work and family will be easier. Americans will pay higher taxes than they
currently do, but the sacrifice will be worth it, because they will receive a
lot in return.
The United States has come a long way on the road to
becoming a good society, but it still has further to travel. Happily, its
history and the experiences of other rich nations show the way forward. One reason the United States is a much
better country today than it was a century ago is that the federal government
does more to ensure economic security, equal opportunity, and shared
prosperity. In the future, it will do more still, and the country will be
better for it.
2 comments:
Lane Kenworthy sounds like a Socialist who wants more Big Government Spending and higher taxes on the working middle class. He wants the Government to redistribute wealth. Since I'm a Libertarian who believes the private sector is far more efficient than the government bureaucracy which wastes tax payer money, I would disagree with his position. He does not address the $18 Trillion Federal Debt which can not be paid off even if you raise the Federal Income tax on all working Americans to 50% and on all corporations to 50% and apply the additional tax to deficit reduction. We are a bankrupt nation in denial. The odds of another depression greater than 2008/2009 are high sometime in the next 5 years in my view.
If we believe that wage-based purchases fuel the economy, then the VAT is regressive as it hits those that spend a larger portion of their income. Also it reduces worker purchasing power in favor of increased government purchases.
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